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Summary 
In this article, we study which institutional factors shape citizens’ views of the local 
accountability of their public officials. Our departing assumption is that evaluations of local 
accountability do not merely reflect citizens’ poltical attitudes and beliefs, but also whether local 
institutions contribute to an environment of mutual trust, accountability and ultimately democratic 
legitimacy. Combining public opinion data from a large-N citizen survey (N=10,651) with contextual 
information for 63 local governments in Ethiopia, we look at access to information, participatory 
planning and the publicness of basic services as potential predictors of citizens’ evaluations of local 
public officials. Our findings suggest that local context matters. Jurisdictions that provide access to 
information on political decision-making are perceived to have more accountable officials. Moreover, 
when local governments provide public fora that facilitate citizens’ stakes in local planning processes, 
it positively affects citizens’ evaluations of the accountability of their officials. Our study adds to the 
empirical literatrure by showing that establishing local institutions that can foster citizen-government 
relations at the local level through inclusive processes is crucial for improving public perceptions of 
accountability. 
Keywords: Access to information, accountability, citizen-government relations, Ethiopia, local 
government, participatory planning, publicness 
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1. Introduction 
Local accountability in developing countries is often regarded as being weak (cf. Narayan, Petesh, 
2002). Improving accountability relations among citizens, street-level bureaucrats and their political 
leaders is repeatedly seen as a ‘silver bullet’ for a more responsive and effective local governance 
structure (see most prominently World Bank, 2003). When citizens are able to hold public officials to 
account, it provides incentives to local governments to deliver (Besley, Ghatak, 2003). Broadly 
speaking those effects may range from the reduction of perceived corruption (Deininger, Mpunga, 
2005) and local nepotism (Crook, 2003), to greater access (Björkmann , Svensson 2007) and better 
quality of basic service delivery (ibid.; Caseley, 2006; Deininger and Mpuga, 2005), ultimately aiming 
at poverty reduction (World Bank, 2003) and fostering state legitimacy (Brinkerhoff, 2005). 
 
Within this article we refer to local accountability as a local form of social accountability, which has 
been described by commentators arguing that citizens in developing contexts increasingly make use 
of more direct, partly informal and new forms of accountability (Anderson, 2006; Goetz, Jenkins, 
2005). This means that citizens themselves more and more hold public officials directly to account 
through ‘new accountability initiatives’, such as participatory planning, participatory budgeting or 
other organised forms of influencing the public sphere and putting public pressure on officials. 
Compared to conventional forms of engagement such as electoral voting, these direct forms of 
collective voice establish a visible connection between citizens’ demands and official actions (Goetz, 
Jenkins, 2005). This is especially important in environments where elections are regarded as 
ineffective in holding public agents to account. 
 
But how do citizens themselves perceive their actual chances of holding local officials direcltly to 
account? And more importantly, what determines their perceptions? Most development research on 
citizens’ attitudes in general and on perceptions of local accountability in particular has mainly 
concentrated on individual level factors to explain the views of citizens. These factors include 
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respondents’ socio-economic characteristics, their political attitudes and beliefs, as well as their 
political reported behaviour. There exists only a few works that look at the role local institutions play 
in this regard, and those studies concentrate on the national level (see for example Bratton, Mattes, 
2001; Mattes, Bratton, 2007) with very little emphasis on sub-national determinants of citizens’ 
perceptions. This is rather surprising since examining structural factors, such as whether local 
governments actual use participatory planning mechanisms or provide performance information for 
the wider public, are important as these factors shape the environments in which citizen-government 
interactions take place. They thus influence the behaviour of citizens and more importantly their 
opinions and attitudes towards local government (Oskamp, Schultz, 2005; Vetter, 2007). Therefore, 
citizen perceptions of accountability may not merely reflect individual respondents’ attitudes and 
beliefs, but also whether local institutions contribute to an environment of mutual trust, 
accountability and ultimately state legitimacy - exemplifying the relevance of studying local 
determinants of citizens’ perceptions of their public officials’ accountability. Furthermore, in order to 
improve perceived and actual accountability relations between citizens and local governments, it is 
important for development policy practioners to uncover the factors that affect citizens’ views 
towards local government. 
 
Studies that look at the role institutional factors play in citizens’ perceptions of local governments in 
OECD countries are quite common (for example Andrews, Cowell, Downe, 2011; Andrews, Van de 
Walle, 2013; Rahn, Rudolph, 2005). However, in development administration research they are rare, 
and there is a notable gap in the current scholarship of studying the linkages between citizens’ 
political attitudes and local institutions in developing countries. Therefore, in this study we look at 
institutional predictors of citizens’ perceptions of the accountability of their local public officials. We 
do so by employing a two-step estimation strategy utilising a unique dataset containing both public 
opinion data and contextual information for 63 local governments in Ethiopia. 
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In the first part of our article we provide a discussion on what we mean when talking about local 
accountability, and subsequently review the existing literature on citizens’ perceptions of 
governments’ accountability. We present our theoretical model by developing hypotheses concerning 
three potential predictors: access to information, participatory planning and publicness of basic 
services. In the second part, we introduce our data, the operationalisation of indicators and make 
reference to the Ethiopian research context. Consecutively, we present the results of our empirical 
investigation, discuss and review our hypotheses. On this basis, we draw conclusions with regard to 
our theoretical model, development policy in general and implications for future research on the 
topic. 
 
2. Local accountability: what are we talking about? 
Lindberg (2009) proposes a typology of different subtypes of accountability, arranged according to 
their 1) source of control, 2) strength of control and 3) spatial distribution (vertical [upward and 
downward] versus horizontal). Systems of checks and balances within governments, for example, are 
regarded as a form of accountability among equals (horizontal), with an external source of control: 
the constitutional law (see also O’Donnel 1998). Electroral, or representative, accountability, in turn, 
describes the possibility of citizens to hold their political leaders to account via elections. This 
subtype of acctountabiliy operates upwards along a vertical dimension between the electorate as the 
principal and elected leaders as the agent.  However, in Ethiopia, local elections are regarded as being 
comparatively ineffective to holding public leaders to account (Aalen, Pausewang 2002; Aalen, 
Tronvoll 2008, 2009). This is especially true after the controversial 2005 national elections and the 
turbulent post-election period, which resulted in a curbing of opposition parties prior to the 2008 
local elections (Aalen, Tronvoll, 2009). Furthermore, here local public officials were used to 
pressurize the local electorate to vote in favour of the ruling party (ibd.). These developments 
emphasise the importance of alternative ways for Ethiopian citizens to hold their local leaders to 
account. 
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Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000, cited after Lindberg 2009) describe a sub-type of accountability 
which has been labelled ‘societal accountability’. It describes the upward vertical accountabillity 
relation between civil society (including the media) and public agents. Here, civil society 
organisations, for example, force political leaders to provide information for their public conduct. 
However, within the Ethiopian context we do not find a strong and independent media and/or civil 
society, especially since the controversial 2005 national elections, and the accmopanying tightening of 
the political arena at the local level (Aalen, Tronvoll, 2009a). Thus, in Ethiopia citizens themselves 
need to play a crucial role in holding officials to account by monitoring their actions, and expressing 
their needs and demands. Within the international donor community this has been labelled as ‘social 
accountability’ (Malena, Forster, Singh, 2004; World Bank 2011). Like the concept of ‘societal 
accountability’ it makes an explicit link between responsiveness and accountability - “[…] the former 
referring to whether governments respond to citizens’ expressed needs, and the latter to whether citizens are able to hold 
governments to their promises” (Malena, Forster, Singh, p. 3). But it also incorporates ordinary citizens and 
not just ‘civil society’ and the media. Practically, social accountability initiatives include citizens’ 
engagement in participatory planning (Blair, 2000; Gaventa, Barett, 2010), participatory budgeting 
(Santos, 1998; Wampler, 2007), or other organised forms of ‘new accountability initiatives’ that 
influence the public sphere (for an overview see Goetz, Jenkins, 2005). Within this article, we refer to 
local accountability as an extended form of social accountability that is exercised at the local level. 
 
3. Linking public perceptions with local accountability 
The way in which citizens perceive government actions can be affected by a number of determinants. 
A considerable amount of studies on citizens’ attitudes towards (local) government in developing and 
developed countries alike strongly emphasise respondents’ social characteristics. This includes, 
among others, effects of age, income, social-class and gender (e.g. Bratton, 2010; Edlund, 1999; 
Klingemann, Fuchs, 1995; Svallfors, 1997). Here, a commonly articulated assumption is the self-
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interest hypothesis: if citizens are, for example, in need of welfare distribution (e.g. those who are 
poor or unemployed), then they are more likely to support governmental policies that aim at 
increasing welfare services. In addition, citizens’ attitudes towards government in general are often 
explained as a result of other underlying political attitudes and more general values, such as trust 
(Bratton, Logan, 2006; Li, 2004), or partisan ideology (Jacoby, 1994; Van de Walle, Jilke, 2013). In 
other words, if citizens have a particular ideological disposition, this may influence their attitudes 
towards government. Sticking with the example of welfare distribution, those citizens who are more 
egalitarian would tend to be in favor of governments that support polices towards increasing welfare 
services (Blekesaune, Quadagno, 2003). As regards local accountability, one may argue that citizens 
who perceive that local governments are acting in their specific interest, e.g. building a school in their 
district, have more positive attitudes towards their local public officials in general. Or citizens who 
are in general optimisc towards government express this in their accountability assessments. 
  
Using data from the Afrobarometer project on public perceptions of local accountability and public 
officials’ responsiveness on a national level, Bratton (2010) studies the effects of i) citizens’ social 
characteristics, ii) their attitudes and beliefs, and iii) their political behaviour. All three sets of 
predictors serve as factors that shape citizen’s views of the responsiveness of their local leaders. 
Furthermore, he stresses that positive perceptions of local government performance matter for 
citizens to form their perceptions. The study also exemplifies that those perceptions are strongly 
driven by local governments’ openness in decision-making, such as positive perceptions of access to 
governmental information, or participatory planning. In other words, if African citizens perceive that 
they “[…] have an ownership stake in the political process, they are more likely to feel satisfied with substantive 
outcomes” (p.19), which in turn influences the way they evaluate the accountability of local leaders. 
These findings highlight the importance of process-oriented factors in the formation of political 
attitudes of African citizens, which, in turn, may also positively influence their subsequent assessment 
of political outcomes. The evidence on self-reported political behaviour, however, is rather weak. 
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Only popular political activism between elections provides a substantive effect. This may suggest that 
contacts with local government representatives are positively related with perceptions of local 
accountability. 
 
An emerging body of literature also finds increasing support for the role of national context in the 
formation of citizens’ political attitudes and perceptions of government. Within Europe, a wide range 
of scholars exemplify this point by illustrating that the ‘performance’ of a country’s economy 
(Blekesaune, Quadagno, 2003; Guldbrandtsen and Skaaning, 2010; Kumlin and Svallvors, 2007), 
different types of welfare regimes (Gelissen, 2001) or political system (Guldbrandtsen, Skaaning, 
2010) matter for public perceptions towards government. Within the developing world, Bratton and 
Logan (2006) find that demand for accountability is related to the institutional legacies of African 
countries. The time from their independence, for example, is positively associated with demands for 
vertical accountability. 
 
Similarly, Escobar-Lemmon and Ross (2011) assess the impact of institutional design, particularly the 
degree of decentralisation, on citizens’ perceptions of accountability in i) managing fiscal resources, 
ii) perceptions of citizen consultations and iii) governmental information sharing in Colombia. 
Besides social characteristics and poltical predictors at the individual-level such as political 
participation, optimism toward government and political knowledge, the authors find that where 
decentralisation has been implemented more extensively, citizens’ evaluations of consultations and 
information sharing are more positive. This implies that contextual factors, such as the degree of 
decentralisation, matter for citizens perceptions of different types of department-level accountability, 
at least within the Colombian case. In terms of individual level predictors, the study illustrates that 
those citizens “[…] who are more involved in and participate in government see it as more accountable” (p.17). 
This again highlights the importance of citizen involvement and contact with public officials which 
increases positive perceptions of accountability. Overall it exemplifies the fact that citizen’s 
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perceptions of public officials are shaped by individual’s experiences with government and the 
(political and administrative) context in which they live.  
 
However, one has to note that the aforementioned study refers to the level of departments, which 
are administrative clusters of numerous jurisdictions. Thus, it does not provide any insight into how 
factors at the local level shape citizens views on local accountability. Still, there has been only limited 
attention to ‘local determinants’ of citizen perceptions towards local government. One notable study 
is the work by Rahn and Rudolph (2005, see also Lyons, Lowery, DeHoog, 1992 for their work on 
city-level predictors of citizen satisfaction with public services). In their study on determinants of 
public trust in local government, the authors look at a set of jurisdictions in the US and found that 
found that attitudes towards local government are not only affected by individual level factors such 
as ideology, or political efficacy, but also by city-level determinants such as political institutions, size 
of population and the composition of the city population. 
 
With a few exceptions, students of public attitudes toward (local) government have examined 
individual or country-level factors in order to predict citizens’ perceptions in general. This is rather 
surprising since it is mainly the local sphere where citizens and the state interact, thus their attitudes 
and perceptions are most likely to be also influenced by the local arena (Oskamp, Schultz, 2005; 
Vetter, 2007). Beside the aforementioned factors that shape citizens attitudes, positive perceptions of 
local accountability may even simply reflect good accountability relations between public officials and 
citizens at large. We assume that those relations are perceived positively in environments where 
citizen-government relations are supported by local institutions, as exemplified by Bratton (2010), 
and Escobar-Lemmon and Ross (2011). Thus, in the following, we will look at potential drivers of 
local accountability that lie at the jurisdictional level. 
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4. Local institutions and citizens’ evaluations 
Recent studies identify government transparency and access to information as pre-conditions for 
upwards vertical accountability to work (for example Bauhr, Grimes, Harring, 2010; Reinikka, 
Svensson, 2004). Once governmental information is made available, they claim, it reduces 
information asymmetries between local governments and their respective citizens. Indeed, greater 
information about the process of local government decision-making and the conduct of public 
officials increases citizens’ capacity to hold their leaders to account (cf. Fox, 2007). Citizens are thus 
empowered to engage in a citizen-government relationship where they judge public officials’ political 
behaviour based on the information they have (Bovens, 2007). According to Willems and Van 
Dooren (2012: 8), once such a political forum has been established, a public official has “[…] an 
obligation to justify his or her conduct, and the accountor [local public officials] may face consequences”. Yet, this does 
not necessarily mean that local leaders will automatically become more accountable once information 
is made available, and we also have to keep in mind the rather harsh political climate in local Ethiopia 
(Aalen, Tronvoll 2009a). However, it dramatically increases the number of local government 
‘auditors’ (Bellver, Kaufmann, 2005) and hence accelerates the possibility of greater accountability. 
This in turn may have positive effects on citizens’ views of their propensity to hold public officials to 
account. 
 
A critical stage of the policy-cycle within (local) governments lies at the stage of decision-making. 
Here, citizens can judge whether public officials’ decision-making is responsive to their needs and 
demands. Providing access to information on the process of local government decision-making is 
crucial for citizens’ perceptions of local accountability. Thus, we assume that people feel they can 
hold public officials to account if they are able to see into the black box of local decision-making. 
Thus, from a process-oriented perceptive, it will positively influence their perceptions of local 
accountability. This leads us to our first hypothesis: 
11 
 
H1: Local governments that provide access to information on political decision-making are more likely to be 
positively perceived in terms of their accountability. 
 
Literature on citizen participation in developing countries illustrates that popular perceptions towards 
local government are shaped by individual’s experiences with government and by the local context 
they live in (see for example Blair, 2000; Dauda, 2006; Gaventa, Barrett, 2010). Dauda (2006), in her 
review of two African local communities concludes that “developing ways of demanding accountability and 
transparency involves developing new political relationships which, in turn, demands popular participation in, and 
engagement with, local government institutions” (p.301). Likewise, in their meta-analysis of 100 case studies 
on citizen engagement, Gaventa and Barrett (2010) find that in a considerable number of cases, 
institutionalised practices of citizen involvement in local governments’ planning processes strengthen 
popular demand for accountability. In other words, if citizens are provided the opportunity to 
participate in the process of local government planning, it makes them more sensitve to the conduct 
of their public officials, which in turn is thought to strengthen local accountability relations (Malena, 
Forster, Singh, 2004). 
 
We thus hypothesise that making use of participatory planning mechanisms at the local level has two 
complementary effects on public assessments towards local accountability. First, citizens are 
sensitised to demand accountability from their elected leaders and public officials - they want to have 
a stake in local government affairs, or at least they should be responsive to their needs and demands. 
Second, their actual participation is thought to make administrative actions in these fields more 
responsive. Moreover, when planning processes go in the opposite direction than planned initially, 
citizens do have an institutionalised fora to hold their public agents to account. Thus we assume that 
jurisdictions that provide institutionalised frames of interaction between citizens and their local 
officials are perceived as being more accountable. This brings us to our second hypothesis: 
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H2: Jurisdictions that employ participatory planning are more likely to be positively evaluated in terms of their 
accountability. 
 
While our second hypothesis mainly adresses the availability of institutionalised participation 
frameworks and the involvement in local government planning processes, we furthermore assume 
that more generic contacts between citizens and public officials have a positive impact on the way 
citizens perceive local accountability. Citizens in jurisdictions that have direct contact with local 
government officials may positively regard the responsiveness and local accountability of their local 
governments. In this vein, basic service delivery - by this we mean the provision of health, water and 
education - is the most frequently used point of interaction between citizens and local government 
representatives. Even if frontline service providers - such as teachers or health workers - are not 
formally elected leaders, for citizens they represent their respective local governments. This, in turn, 
makes local government more visible for ordinary citizens. Therefore, the process of citizen 
interactions with frontline service providers contributes to the bonding between citizens and local 
government (Van de Walle, Scott, 2011). 
 
Such interactions between citizens and public officials are more likely if basic services are publicly 
provided, when compared to non-profit or private provision. Thus the publicness of service delivery, 
or more precisely the degree of publicness (defined by its ownership status) as perceived by citizens, 
may be reflected in their evaluations of the accountability of their jurisdictions and its public officials. 
Thus we assume that the degree of publicness of basic services in local governments is positively 
related with citizens’ evaluations of local accountability. However, if basic services are provided 
through private or nonprofit suppliers, citizens may disregard their chances to hold public agents to 
account, as they then perceive them as ‘too far away’. This brings us to our third hypothesis: 
H3: The degree of publicness of basic services within a jurisdiction is positively related with citizens’ perceptions 
of local accountability. 
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5. Research context, data and measures 
Our research focuses on local governments in Ethiopia, East-Africa, and our empirical tests rely on a 
dataset that comprises contextual information on local governments and data on citizens’ perceptions 
of local accountability from a Citizen Report Card (CRC). We estimate a hierarchical model with 
citizens’ perceived accountability as the dependent variable using jurisdictional predictors, such as 
whether jurisdictions employ participatory planning, grant citizens access to key governmental 
information or provide basic services through public channels. 
 
The primary unit of our analysis is Ethiopian local governments. Ethiopia is a federal republic with 
eleven regional states, including two city-administrations. Its administrative structure is a three-tier 
system which consists of a federal government, regional states, and local governments. At the local 
level, our analytical unit, substantial decentralisation reforms have been initiated by the Government 
of Ethiopia in collaboration with international donors in the early 1990s and implemented in the 
following decades. This includes administrative devolution, the delegation of responsibilities for basic 
service delivery, greater fiscal autonomy of local governments (e.g. through the introduction of an 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer scheme) and local capacity building (Chanie, 2009; Garcia, 
Rajkumar, 2008; World Bank, 2007). However, one has to note that full fiscal autonomy within 
jurisdictions has been achieved very seldomly. There remains a high fiscal dependency on regional 
and central government in order to be able to effectively fulfill local government functions (Garcia, 
Rajkumar, 2008). 
 
In Ethiopia, elections largely serve as “[…] instruments of political control rather than devices of liberty” 
(Aalen, Tronvoll 2009:193). During the national elections 2000 and local elections in 2001, for 
example, Ethiopian’s ruling party Ethiopian People’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
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gained a substantial share of votes by oppressing the electorate and opposition parties (Aalen, 
Pausewang, 2002). In contrast to this stand the pre-2005 national elections period; this initially has 
been conducted in a relatively fair manner by providing a level playing field for opposition parties 
and the press. However, the situation started worsening the closer the election date came, and 
eventually resulted in a harsh tightening of the legal space for opposition parties and civil society 
during the post-elections period (Aalen, Tronvoll, 2009). Manifesting their political power, the 
EPRDF increasingly made use of local public officials to secure their support at the local basis. Some 
commentators report that the EPRDF deliberately uses local administrators to pressurize the 
electorate to vote in their favour (ibd.). In such a harsh political climate, alternatives forms of 
accountability gain importance. 
 
In the light of these developments, the reform of local accountability relations has been put at the 
forefront of development initiatives in Ethiopia. Following the Ethiopian parliamentary elections of 
2005 and its violent aftermath, a considerable share of the international donor community withdrew 
direct budget support to Ethiopia and implemented novel aid modalities. They focused on the 
protection of basic services and the improvements of accountability structures at the local level 
(World Bank, 2010). These reforms included various sub-programs aimed at improving social 
accountability relations, e.g. through greater access to governmental information. 
 
For our empirical analysis, we utilise data from the third Ethiopian Woreda and City Administration 
Benchmarking Survey (WCBS III) which was conducted in early 2010. On behalf of the Ethiopian 
Government, WCBS III was administered by an international consortium consisting of the Ethiopian 
Central Statistical Agency, the Ministry of Capacity Building, the World Bank, the Canadian 
International Development Agency and the UK Department for International Development. The 
core part of WCBS III is a survey of local government representatives (supply-side survey). It collects 
administrative information on topics such as finance, human resources and service delivery, among 
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others. The supply-side survey targets those local governments with a population of 10,000 
inhabitants or above. It makes use of a multi-stage stratified random sampling with stratifications of 
all relevant Ethiopian jurisdictions according to i) remoteness from the regional capital and ii) food 
security. Based upon probability proportional to size (PPS), where size is the population of the 2007 
national census, 384 out of 601 jurisdictions (64%) have been randomly selected to take part in the 
supply-side component of WCBS III (Government of Ethiopia, 2010). 
 
In addition to the supply-side component of WCBS III, a public opinion survey (a so-called Citizen 
Report Card) was conducted. It collects the views and perceptions of 10,657 citizens for different 
aspects of local government performance, service delivery and accountability. For our study, we will 
combine data from both sources. For the CRC survey, a subsample of 68 jurisdictions from the 
supply-side sample of 384 jurisdictions has been drawn randomly by the Ethiopian Central Statistical 
Authority. During the CRC fieldwork, second-stage sampling units through enumeration areas (EA) 
within each jurisdiction were selected using PPS, where size is the number of households in each EA 
- households were selected at random from within the EA by fieldworkers (ibd.). Due to non-
responses we work with a total number of 63 jurisdictions. These jurisdictions represent all of 
Ethiopian’s regions and city administrations1.  
 
 
Dependent variable 
We use citizens’ perceptions of local accountability as our dependent variable. More specifically, 
respondents have been asked to indicate on a four-point Likert scale “If local government leaders fail to 
keep their promises, how much do you think an ordinary person can do to improve the situation?”. The evaluations 
of their chances to hold local leaders to account are used as a measure for citizens’ perceptions of 
                                                 
1 The number of jurisdictions included in the study can be found in parenthesis: Addis Ababa (1); Afar (1); Amhara (10); 
Benishangul-Gumuz (2); Gambela (1); Harari (1); Oromia (24); Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (13); 
Somali (4); Tigray (6). 
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local accountability. In line with our initial assumptions, evaluations across jurisdictions are not 
evenly distributed, which suggests that there are structural differences in citizens’ perceptions of local 
accountability across local governments. Table one exemplifies that there is a considerable variance 
across citizens from different jurisdictions. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Independent variables 
We use access to information on political decision-making as one of our main predictors for citizens’ 
perceptions of local accountability. During the supply-side survey of WCBS III, representatives of 
local governments were asked whether citizens had access to the agendas and decisions taken at 
council meetings within their jurisdictions. Based on this, citizens would have the chance to monitor 
the actual decision-making behaviour of their elected representatives and public officials. Local 
governments that do provide such information have been coded ‘1’, those that do not ‘0’. 
As regards participatory planning, local government representatives have been asked “Do you employ 
participatory planning? If yes, whom do you consult when preparing the strategic plan, the budget capital investment 
plan, and changes in service delivery?”2. When jurisdictions have indicated that they consult ordinary 
citizens, we have coded our variable ‘1’, in all other cases it was coded ‘0’. By this, we want to make 
sure that we only measure participatory planning mechanisms that are open to all citizens, and not 
only for local elites. 
As regards the publicness of basic service delivery, we constructed a scale which aims at measuring 
the overall degree of basic service delivery in Ethiopian jurisdictions by focussing on the ownership 
status of service delivery. This approach is commonly used among scholars interested in the effects 
of different degrees of publicness of service provision (cf. Andrews, Boyne, Walker, 2011). In doing 
so, we grouped jurisdictions in three categories for each service under consideration: i) private or 
                                                 
2 Possible answers included: Citizens, business community, local associations, NGOs, regional government, federal 
government. 
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non-profit provision, ii) mixed provision, iii) public provision - due to item non-response this 
indicator was only available for 59 jurisdictions. Then we took the ownership status of service 
provision for health services, primary education and water provision and transformed them into a 
scale using principal factor analysis3. A higher value indicates a higher degree of publicness. The 
excellent Cronbach’s Alpha score of 0.83 exhibits that we are indeed measuring a latent construct of 
the publicness of basic services. 
 
Control variables – jurisdictional level 
We seek to control for other important factors that might have an influence on our results. In this 
regard, we first control for food security as a proxy indicator for the poverty status within 
jurisdictions. A number of works have repeatedly used food security and hunger as proxies for 
poverty (for an overview see Maxwell, 2003). Doing so, we use the official food security classification 
of the Government of Ethiopia, as provided within the supply-side data of WCBS III. In OECD 
countries, respondents’ economic status is widely acknowledged to be positively related with citizens’ 
attitudes and perceptions towards government (see for example Battaglio, Legge, 2009), and evidence 
within developing and transition countries points in a similar direction (Bratton, Logan, 2006; 
Escobar-Lemmon, Ross, 2010). In the Ethiopian case, we thus assume that within food secure 
jurisdictions, citizens’ perceptions of local accountability are relatively better. 
Taking into account the rural-urban divide in many aspects of the lives of African citizens, we 
furthermore control for rurality. We do this by using whether a jurisdiction is connected to an all-
weather road as a proxy indicator. This item has been included in the supply-side questionnaire of 
WCBS III. Empirical works using Afrobarometer data (Bratton, 2010) have indicated that rural 
citizens in African countries do rate local governments’ responsiveness higher than those living in 
urban areas. This is mainly so because in rural areas, the gap between citizens and their leaders might 
                                                 
3 The extracted factor reveals an Eigenvalue of 1.83. We also estimated our models using an additive index, it produced 
analogous findings to those obtained in this study. 
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be smaller, since residents of more homogenous and village-like jurisdictions may have stronger 
bonds with their neighbours, including their councillors and administrators. Hence we assume that 
rurality does have a positive effect on perceived accountability. 
Furthermore, we use the total number of the jurisdictions’ population in order to control for its size. 
These figures were taken from the Ethiopian census data of 2007 (CSA, 2007). In line with research 
on the rural nature of a jurisdiction, we assume that smaller jurisdictions, in terms of their overall 
population, exhibit higher levels of perceived accountability. 
Ethiopia’s jurisdictions can be divided into two different types: so-called woredas and cities/ city 
administrations. Woredas are mostly villages, while cities and city administrations are chartered local 
governments which perform a wide range of service delivery functions. In order to control for 
potential effects arising from differences in allocating different governmental functions to different 
types of jurisdictional entities, we control for the type of jurisdiction. We do so by constructing a 
dummy variable with ‘1’ for woredas and ‘0’ for cities/ city administrations. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
6. Statistical results 
In this study we test the direct effects of local institutional characteristics, such as access to 
governmental information, the availability of participatory planning procedures and the publicness of 
basic services on citizens’ perceptions of the accountability of their public officials. Since our data is 
of hierarchical nature - individuals nested in jurisdictions – and our primary interest is in estimating 
contextual effects of citizens’ perceptions of local accountability, we employ a two-step estimation 
strategy. In this regard, we follow the procedure recommended by Jusko and Shively (2005) and first 
estimate a conventional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model with individuals’ perceptions of local 
accountability as the dependent variable, controlling for respondents’ socio-economic status and 
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institutional trust4. Subsequently we calculate the standard deviation from the regression line for each 
jurisdiction. In a second step, we use the residuals’ standard deviation from step one to perform a 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) model with known variance set-up. Because of space 
considerations and our primary interest in the second-step results, descriptive statistics and the 
accompanying results of our first-step estimation are not included in the text, but can be found in the 
annex of this artile. 
 
In table 3, the results from the FGLS models can be found. To illustrate the effects of our predictors, 
the first model incorporates all our control variables with access to information on political decision-
making as the independent variable. In the second and the third model, we examine the availability of 
participatory planning mechanisms and the degree of publicness of basic service delivery respectively. 
The final model includes all our predictors simultaneously. Our models are robust to different model 
specifications.5 Moreover, we also estimated the same model using a (one-step) multilevel modelling 
strategy. Results are analogous to the ones presented in this article. To correct for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the regional level e.g. differences in their developmental status, all models are 
estimated using fixed-effects for all regional states – not reported in the models. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Our control variables make a statistically significant contribution to the explanatory power of our 
models and all have the expected effect direction. Our final model shows that within rural 
jurisdictions, evaluations of local accountability are more positive than those in urban areas. 
Furthermore, the type of jurisdiction also matters. Within cities, perceptions of local accountability 
                                                 
4 Control variables include respondents’ gender, age, education and self-perceived poverty status. We, furthermore, 
controlled for respondents’ trust in local government (descriptive statistics and question wording can be found in the 
annex). 
5 Our findings are also not distorted by multicollinearity which can be shown by an average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
of 3.41 with no single variable exceeding a VIF value of  5.5 or a tolerance value of less than 1.8 (Besley, Kuh and Welsh, 
1980). 
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are on average greater than within woredas. We also find that food security is positiviely associated 
with perceptions of local accountability. 
 
The individual assessment of each of our main independent variables shows their added value in 
predicting our citizens’ perceptions of accountability (models 1-3). The full model displays the effects 
of each predictor while controlling for other possible influences. In this regard, our predictor variable 
on access to information is statistically significant across both models. It has a considerable effect; 
whether a jurisdiction provides access to information on political decision-making results in a .36 
change on the accountability perception scale of ones jurisdiction. This provides support for 
hypothesis one which states that local governments that provide access to information on political 
decision-making are more likely to be positively perceived in terms of their accountability. As regards 
participatory planning, our independent variable is also statistically significant across both models. Its 
effect is slightly weaker than the one for access to information, but still has a reasonable influence on 
citizens’ perceptions of local accountability. When jurisdictions employ participatory planning, it 
changes citizens’ accountability evaluations across jursidictions by .33 on average. This supports 
hypothesis two which notes that jurisdictions that employ participatory planning are more likely to be 
positively evaluated in terms of their accountability. As regards the degree of publicness of basic 
service provision, our third predictor variable is also statistically significant across both models – 
though it has a p-value at the 10% significance level for the full model. Also, one can see that its 
magnitude strongly decreases when access to information and participatory planning are entered into 
the equation. The final model shows that a one unit change on our publicness scale increases the 
accountability evaluation of ones jurisdiction by only .09 on average. This lends some support to 
hypothesis three, which notes that jurisdictions where basic services are provided through public 
channels are more likely to be positively perceived by citizens. However, we need to further examine 
whether this effect is substantial in nature. 
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Thus, to further assess the substantial magnitude of our main independent variables, we estimate 
their predicted values while holding all other covariates constant at their mean values (cf. King et al., 
2000). The results are presented in figure 1. The upper left panel shows the differences between 
providing and not providing access to governmental information on political decision-making. One 
can see that both values are statistically distinct from each other with no overlappings of their 
corresponding 95% confidence bounds. As regards participatory planning (upper right panel), one 
can see that whether a jursidiction provides an institutionalised fora for participatory planning has a 
substantive effect on citizens’ accountability evaluations. Here as well, the 95% confidence bounds 
are not overlapping. Finally, we evaluate the substantive magnitude of jursidictions’ publicness of 
basic service delivery on citizens’ perceptions of accountability. The lower panel of figure 1 displays 
the predicted values of the publicness of basic services on perceptions of accountability (y-axis) for 
different degrees of publicness (x-axis). From the figure we can see that the lower and the upper 
bound of the 95% confidence interval are completely overlapping6, which suggest that the revealed 
effect is not of substantive magnitude. Thus, on these grounds we have very limited support for 
hypothesis three; we find a positive relation between the publicness of basic service delivery within 
jurisdictions and citizens’ perceptions of local accountability. However, this association is of trivial 
magnitude. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In sum, our evidence suggests that two out of three jurisdictional factors that we incorporated in our 
model make a significant difference for citizens’ perceptions of local accountability. First, local 
government transparency matters; providing citizens access to information on the process of political 
decision-making positively contributes to citizens’ evaluations of local accountability. Second, 
providing opportunities for citizen participation matters; it provides an institutionalised forum for 
                                                 
6 Plotting the same graph with 90% confidence intervals instead, reveals as well as a rather non-substantive effect. 
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interactions between public agents and the citizenry at large, and, moreover, gives citizens the chance 
to have a stake in local government planning processes. It thus positively contributes to their 
perceptions of local accountability. Third, however, the degree of publicness of basic service delivery 
does not seem to matter to any large extend. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
We have presented an empirical test of local institutional factors - particularly access to information, 
participatory planning and publicness of basic services - and their impact on citizens’ perceptions of 
local accountability in Ethiopian local governments. Our empirical results show that two out of the 
three factors matter. Once a jurisdiction adopts participatory planning and/or provides access to 
information on political decision-making, it positively affects the way in which citizens perceive the 
accountability of their officials. In sum, both factors are thought to improve the relationship between 
citizens and their respective local governments. Hence, our findings suggest that establishing local 
institutions that can foster citizen-government relations at the local level are crucial for improving 
public attitudes towards local government. Furthermore, positive attitudes towards local government, 
furthermore, strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the state at the local level. Thus development 
practioners and policy-makers may take these institutional factors into account when reforming local 
governments. 
 
Our study did not reveal a substantial association between the publicness of basic service delivery 
and citizens’ perceptions of local accountability, as suggested by our third hypothesis. However, one 
has to note that we were not able to effectively differentiate between the regional and local 
ownership status of service provision. This may have an impact on the way in which citizens perceive 
local accountability, since the regional level is an independent adminstrative and political tier. Future 
studies are advised to more effectively select cases that provide a clear differentiation between 
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different levels of public service provision. In the absence of such infomration, future research may 
look, for example, at differences between public service users and non-users in terms of their 
attitudes towards (local) government. Research so far (MacLean, 2011) has identified differences in 
political behaviour between public service users and non-users across African countries; however, the 
role of public opinion is still underexplored. For now, our evidence is inconclusive in this regard. 
 
This study is also not without limitations in terms of the political climate in which the research was 
conducted. One has to remember the harsh political climate in which local governments in Ethiopia 
operate. Some authors have claimed that local public officials are often used to perpetuate the 
political dominance of the ruling party EPRDF, for example by extensively monitoring citizens’ 
political behaviour (Aalen, Tronvoll, 2009). This may have influenced survey repondents to fear that 
they could be identified and punished later on, thus giving overly positive survey reponses. During 
survey design and interviewer training this was a very sensible point. Therefore, the entire data 
collection of the CRC was done independently by a local research company, with the World Bank as 
the official sponsor – interviewers were trained in a way that they clearly emphasized the political 
independence of this research. Still, we cannot confidently rule-out that respondents did give such 
biased responses. Thus the results of this study should be interpreted with care. Moreover, one has to 
note that this study is indeed about perceptions of accountability and not actually accountability. It 
could also be that citizens are quite unrealisitic about their actual chances ot hold public offcicials to 
acocunt. Thus future work may try to combine survey items of perceived with experienced 
accounability, e.g. whether citizens ever have hold a local agent to acocunt themselves. 
 
This study makes a contribution to research on citizens’ attitudes in developing countries by focusing 
on the contribution local jurisdictions can make in enhancing the arena in which citizen-government 
interactions take place. Those interactions form the basis that shapes citizens’ political attitudes and 
perceptions of local governments. Thus we have laid down a first stepping stone in assessing the role 
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of local context for citizens’ opinion about local government in developing countries. This seems to 
be especially important when considering the authoritarian character of Ethiopia. Further research 
may look into the potential complementary effects local institutions and individual attitudes and 
beliefs may have for individual assements of local accountability. Another possible future area of 
research might be the assessment of actual outcomes of local government participation processes and 
their effects on citizens’ perceptions, while controlling for contextual factors. As for now we have 
only focused on process indicators (are certain facilities provided?), and the relationship between 
citizens and public officials. Further investigations of possible interactions between both process and 
outcome might reveal potentially interesting findings. 
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Annex 
Table 1: CRC data on perceived accountability across 63 jurisdictions 
Public officials' 
accountability 
Percent of survey 
respondents* 
Max. percent in 
jurisdictions 
Min. percent in 
jurisdictions 
A great deal 14 41 2 
Something 34 60 11 
Very little 25 56 6 
Nothing 24 63 3 
If local leaders fail to keep their promise how much do you think an ordinary person can do to improve the 
situation? 
* Missing percentage points are missing values 
N = 10,657 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics – jurisdictional level 
Variable Name Mean Standard Deviation Min, Max N Source 
Perceived Accountability 1.412 0.372 0.685, 2.306 63 CRC 
Jurisdiction type 0.698 0.463 0, 1 63 Supply-side 
Population 115116.9 81804.53 12657, 388788 63 CSA 2007 
Food security 0.397 0.493 0, 1 63 Supply-side 
Rurality 0.159 0.368 0, 1 63 Supply-side 
Access to information 0.714 0.455 0, 1 63 Supply-side 
Participation 0.841 0,368 0, 1 63 Supply-side 
Publicness of basic service delivery 1.46e-08 0.914 -2.563, .616 59 Supply-side 
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Table 3: Second-step model (FGLS): the impact of jurisdictional factors on perceived local accountability 
Independent 
variable 
Information 
Model 
SE Participation 
Model 
SE Publicness 
Model 
SE Full Model SE 
                  
Constant 1.740** .227 1.726** .230 2.151** .222 1.509** .253 
Jurisdiction type -.199* .064 -.201* .064 -.215* .068 -.230** .068 
Population .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000+ .000 
Food security .121* .058 .110+ .058 .085 .061 .138* .062 
Rurality .123 .078 .246* .078 .242* .082 .193* .083 
          
Information .331** .073     .364** .074 
Participation   .332** .083   .329* .095 
Publicness     .124* .047 .087+ .050 
                
Model chi-square 144.10** 139.52** 116.77** 150.98** 
J 63 63 59 59 
Note: significance levels: +p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests).  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics – individual level (CRC) 
Variable Name & Wording Mean SD Min, Max N 
Local accountability 
If local government leaders fail to keep their promises, how 
much do you think an ordinary person can do to improve 
the situation? 
1: A great deal; 2: Something; 3 Very little; 4: Nothing. 
2.411685 1.007 1, 4 10321 
Gender (Ref: Male) 1.453 .498 1, 2 10,657 
Age 38.147 12.390 18, 99 10,657 
School attendance 
Have you attended school? 
1.577 .494 1, 2 10,657 
Poverty status  
Which of the following categories would you out yourself in? 
1: Very poor; 2: Poor; 3: Neither poor nor non-poor; 4: 
Non-poor. 
2.585 .781 1, 4 10,657 
Trust in local government 
How much do you trust each of the following to do their job 
fairly or don't you know enough about them to say? 
Your City Administration/ Woreda council 
1: Not at all; 2: Not very much; 3: A little; 4: A lot; 5: 
Don’t know. 
2.7 .957 1, 5 10,657 
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Table 5: First-step regression: individual-level OLS with preceptions of accountability as dependent variable 
Independent variable Beta coefficient SE 
      
Constant 2.041** .066 
Gender (Ref: Male) -.064** .020 
Age .004 .001 
School attendance (Ref: Not attended) .082** .021 
Poverty status (Ref: Very poor)   
  Poor .113** .037 
  Neither poor nor non-poor .157** .036 
  Non-poor  .101**  .046 
Trust in local government (Ref: Not at all)   
  Not very much  .046** .034  
  A little .114** .031 
  A lot .105** .035 
  Don’t know .032* .051 
      
R² .031 
Adjusted R² .030  
F-test 32.73** 
N 10,321 
Note: significance levels: +p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .001 (two-tailed tests).  
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Figure 1: Predicted values for main independent variables (95% confidence intervals) 
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